What We Prove

An honest account — written for legal and compliance teams

Most "proof" in freight is a PDF that looks fine. This page is the opposite of that: a plain, honest account of exactly what a FreightProof record proves, what it does not prove, and why the distinction is the whole point. We are not selling certainty. We are selling a provable process — and that is what the law actually asks for.

The claim we make — and the one we don't

We do not claim that a document is true, that a sensor cannot be fooled, that a record is "courtroom-ready" by our say-so, or that anything is impossible to forge. Any vendor who tells you that is selling you a liability.

We claim something narrower and far more defensible: that a specific set of data was observed at a specific time, from a specific source, and has not changed since — and that anyone can verify all of that without trusting us. That is a provable process. Here is precisely what it covers.

What a FreightProof record proves

  • What the data showed, and when. A record captures exactly what a source returned at a specific, timestamped moment — not "sometime recently."
  • That it has not changed since. The record is sealed with a cryptographic fingerprint. Change one character and the fingerprint no longer matches — so tampering is detectable by anyone, not just by us.
  • Where it came from. The record carries its provenance: which source it was pulled from, and for a document, the signature that already travels with it (see "the building blocks" below).
  • Who signed it. Records signed by an issuer — an insurer, a lessor, a maintenance shop, a government data snapshot — carry that issuer's signature, which the carrier cannot forge.
  • That anyone can check it. Take the data, recompute the fingerprint, compare it to the sealed value. No FreightProof account, no special software, and no trust in our scoring required.

    • What it does NOT prove — and we will say so in writing

  • It does not prove the underlying government or third-party data is correct — only that we faithfully captured what the source returned. Garbage in is still garbage, just signed and timestamped.
  • It does not prove a sensor or feed was not spoofed. A compromised source produces a record that is sealed but wrong. We make tampering and divergence detectable — we do not make them impossible.
  • It does not prove the carrier will behave after the check. It proves what was true at the moment of the check, nothing about next Tuesday.
  • It does not, by itself, establish legal admissibility. That is a decision for a court under its own rules of evidence. We build the record to satisfy those rules — authenticity, integrity, a clear chain — but we are not the judge, and we will not pretend to be.

    • Why a provable process is what the duty of care actually needs

    Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II (the Supreme Court's 9-0 ruling that federal law does not preempt state negligent-selection claims against brokers) asks a process question: what did you know about this carrier, driver, and truck, and when did you know it?

    A provable process answers that question directly — and it does not require anyone to have been perfect. The defense is not "the data was flawless." The defense is: "here is the verifiable record of the diligence we performed, sealed at the time, that no one has altered since." Perfection is not the standard. A documented, tamper-evident, reasonable process is.

    The building blocks (in plain terms)

  • A cryptographic fingerprint (SHA-256 — the federal standard, FIPS 180-4). A short, unique fingerprint of the exact data. Any change produces a different fingerprint, so tampering is detectable by anyone who has the original.
  • A trusted timestamp. The record is bound to a specific moment, so "when did you know it" has a precise, defensible answer.
  • Digital signatures. Each record carries the signature of whoever produced it. And where a document already arrived signed — an insurer's email is signed by their mail domain, a DocuSign envelope carries its own signature — we bind that existing signature, so the document's origin is provable without the issuer doing anything new.
  • Independent verification. Everything above can be checked by your own team or an opposing expert, with no dependence on us. That independence is what makes it credible.
  • Optional blockchain anchoring. A third-party timestamp that even FreightProof cannot move or backdate, for records where that extra independence is worth it.

    • For your legal team

  • Ask for the sealed record and the verification steps. You should be able to verify authenticity and integrity yourself.
  • A record tells you what was checked, from which sources, at what time, and whether it has changed since — the elements a custody/diligence question turns on.
  • The carrier owns its data and discloses exactly what a given request needs. Because each record is sealed and (optionally) anchored, a withheld item tends to show up as a gap, not a clean story — which is the right posture for an honest record, not a curated one.

    • The bottom line

    We are honest about the limits because the honesty is the product. A record that overclaims is the first thing opposing counsel attacks. A record that proves exactly what it proves — what was observed, when, by whom, that it is sealed and unaltered, verifiable by anyone — is the one that holds up. In an industry running on documents that merely look fine, that is the difference.

    Related: see how it works end to end in ELD Clearance, the fraud classes it reduces in Reducing Freight Fraud, or contact us to talk it through with your team.